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Old and New Approaches to Marketing – The Quest of Their Epistemological Roots 
 
Abstract 
In  recent  years  the  marketing  discipline  faced  a  considerable  increase  in  the  number  of 
approaches.  This paper try to investigate if the proliferation of labels related to alleged new 
methods  of  marketing  analysis  actually  implies  a  distinctions  of  subjects  being  studied  and 
different epistemological premises. 
 
1.  In search of a conceptual classification 
1.1 The proliferation of marketing problematics  
This  article  was  born  from  the  observation  that  marketing  science  is  facing  a  growing 
proliferation  of  thematics  and  approaches.  This fact is not new and generally coincides with 
significant transformations in the international economic system
1. Lately, however, marketing 
studies favoured a fragmented interpretation of consumer and firm’s realities, thus creating an 
explosion of new labels. Some of these new labels are probably just new “names” advertised to 
sell “old” products. But some may contain significant new issues that need to be identified and 
discussed. Do these new marketing denominations (viral, retro, vintage, postmodern, judo, tribal, 
buzz,  and  many  more)  identify  distinctions  on  subjects  being  studied,  without  particular 
methodological implications, or rather, do new labels and new subjects imply orientations that 
start from different epistemological premises and involve different research methodologies? If the 
answer  is  affirmative,  then  what  are  the  most  significant  methodological  differences?  The 
differentiation of actual content of various approaches to marketing has obviously already been 
dealt  with  in  a  large  number  of c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  s e e m s  that  the  range  of  different 
approaches has been considered primarily in terms of the object of study - consider, for example, 
the debates on micro and macro marketing
2. A much less analyzed issue is whether a different 
object of study is also embedded in diverse epistemological hypotheses. Marketing, as Kotler 
thinks or describes it, seems to refer to methodological hypotheses and interpretative models that 
are substantially different from those that characterize postmodern marketing
3. Our impression, in 
                                                 
1 We indicate, for example, debates of the 1960s on the system and environmental approach to marketing and in the 
1970s on the consistency of scientific marketing and in those same years, on micro and macromarketing.  
2 See Hunt & Burnett (1982).  
3 See for example  “Kotler is dead!” of Alan Smithee (1997), Brown (1995) and Cova (1996).   3
general, is that the effort of the authors to clarify the characteristics of new proposed approaches 
is too limited, leaving the reader with uncertainties on their methodological position. In particular, 
the  aspect  that  we  think  is  most  neglected,  and  which  is  of  crucial  value  for  the  correct 
understanding  of  new  approaches,  is  the  methodological,  and  especially  the  epistemological, 
characterization of the new scientific proposals. The risk of this proliferation of approaches
4, 
insufficiently  delineated  in  their  epistemological  assumptions,  is  incommunicability.  Our 
objective thus is to undertake a taxonomy of methodological specificity that characterizes the 
most significant marketing approaches, seeking to highlight the epistemological differences and 
the effects that these differences produce in the way to interpret it. Our objective is not to evaluate 
the validity of the different approaches, a goal that would undoubtedly be of extreme interest, but 
which seems to us to be too ambitious in this particular setting
5. We aim at building a taxonomic 
grid that allows a fruitful comparison of different methodological assumptions. 
 
1.2  The integration and opposition of the different epistemological schools  
Our taxonomy is articulated on the following three levels:  
a.  the epistemological level or rather, the alternative approaches with which the methodological 
statute of the various sciences are defined;   
b.  the economic theory level that defines the evolution of research approaches that are most 
relevant for economic science and therefore also for the firm theory; 
c.  the marketing theory level with regards to their corresponding economic and epistemological 
approach.  
This taxonomy range from general (1
st level) to more specific themes (2
nd and 3
rd level). We 
assume,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  close  connection  between  a  1°  level  approach  and  the 
corresponding  and  coherent  approaches  that  can  be  identified  on  the  2°  and  the  3°  level.  In 
different words, one who, at the first level, assumes an epistemological approach of some kind 
(e.g.: “empiricist”) is expected to (or should) assume the same approach at the level of both 
                                                 
4 The analysis of the reasons for the proliferation of approaches would also be a matter of great interest that we 
cannot however tackle here, but it should be mentioned that some of the reasons are the globalization process and a 
proliferation of communication channels (ICT) through which new communicators are able to express their positions. 
Other reasons stem from the fact that the formulation of the different approaches has become part of a market system 
(management training market, university education market, consultancy market, etc.) and therefore the comparison of 
ideas does not always have a prevailing scientific basis. 
5 Of course the taxonomy inevitably entails some form of judgment, but here we will seek to build a reading grid, as 
neutral as possible, in an attempt to clarify the most significant  specificities of different approaches.   4
economic and marketing theory (respectively, the second and the third level of the taxonomy). 
Of course we are aware that our taxonomy is a simplification; however we believe this is an 
appropriate instrument to open a fruitful debate on the analysis criteria and on the subject matter 
in question. Maybe someone will want to revise some classification criteria here and there, while 
someone else perhaps will intend to review the whole taxonomy from its foundations. We accept 
this and we affirm that similar opposing arguments are useful and productive because this is what 
should  take  place  in  a  mutual  clarification  of  positions,  instead    of  present  debate,  which  is 
conducted in uncertain and disorderly way, without precise forms of comparison and without 
appropriate conceptual tools. For example, some may ask why analyzing the various marketing 
contributions we concerned ourselves with classifying economic and epistemological approaches 
as well. The answer is that a contrast of approaches and marketing theories alone (3° level) would 
not have allowed us to clarify (or attempt to do so) the classification. The meaning and scope of 
the various marketing theories can be expressed with sufficient accuracy only looking backwards 












2.  The epistemological level.  
2.1  The source of knowledge 
Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge is the science that studies knowledge in general, but 
above all, it studies the particular form of knowledge that is scientific knowledge
6 and therefore 
                                                 
6 According to some, the only form of "real" knowledge is scientific knowledge and therefore this term also covers 
any form of knowledge, but we feel that this issue can be omitted here. 


































Exhibit no. 1 - Taxonomical Grid  5
the scientific validity of the different sciences and scientific approaches. What we must achieve at 
this level is a classification of the approaches that were (and are) used as the basis of the various 
theories of knowledge. The difficulty in this classification is that each approach has gone through 
a long evolution and through numerous changes over time as a result of debates among scholars. 
We cannot give an account of the enormous variety of individual approaches and thus we propose 
to group them according to their prevalent paradigms
7. However, although every paradigm is a 
living conceptualization, evolving over time, the modifications do not put their inner core in 
doubt. Thus, if in a synchronic sense it is possible that some paradigms have a well-defined 
identity, as can be said for example of empiricism in the XVII and XVIII century, in a diachronic 
sense the empiricist paradigm has somewhat changed as a result of the need to overcome intrinsic 
methodological  difficulties  and  responding  to  criticism  brought  about  by  alternative  research 
approaches. Unfortunately, in the space available in an article, it is necessary to introduce some 
simplifications but we think that this is acceptable with reference to the scope of our analysis. 
In order to classify the different approaches from a methodological point of view we posed the 
following question: what is the source of scientific knowledge? The schools of thought give 
different answers to this question. In our 1° level taxonomy the most significant answers appear 
to be the following: 
(a)   experience ("empiricism”)  
(b)   reason ("radical rationalism”)  
(c)   reason together with experience ("critical rationalism”)  
(d)   historical reason together with experience ("weberian" approach)  
(e)   human empathy with historical reality ("hermeneutic" approach) 
Of course each approach has many internal specifications since there is no outstanding scholar 
who has not elaborated his own original approach and which should therefore, strictly speaking, 
occupy a single and exclusive box in our taxonomic system. Obvious reasons of simplicity lead 
us  to  regroup  different  authors  into  a  single  box.  Consequently,  the  denominations  of  the 
individual approaches are regarded as useful in order to define a certain approach without the 
proposed denomination being assigned an absolute value. We intentionally refer with quotation 
marks to the approaches outlined in the prior illustration. Herewith following we eliminate the 
quotation marks for simplicity, but it is understood that these labels have purely heuristic valence 
                                                 
7 The concept of paradigm entered the epistemological vocabulary through the work of Khun  (1962).   6
also because the individual approaches evolved over a long period of time and have gone through 
a multiplicity of adjustments that in this context are impossible to account for. However, within a 
framework  that  has  known  numerous  and  profound  changes,  some  fundamental  differences 
remain that justify both combining them in the extended categories indicated here with the term 
"approach"  and  using  corresponding  labels  as  a  distinction  of  the  approaches.  A  particularly 
relevant aspect, which we return to later, is that these approaches in some cases are thought of as 
relevant  to  all  the  sciences  (natural  and  social)  without  distinction,  in  other  cases,  a  certain 
approach is instead focused on either only the natural or only the social sciences. For example, 
the empiricist approach was born in the XVI Century, that is to say, a period when only natural 
sciences were considered. The social sciences were either not taken into account or were subject 
to  reductionism
8 t h a t  a s s i m i l a t e d  t h e m ,  u l t i m a t e l y ,  t o   natural  events.  For  instance,  in  a 
mechanistic version of science there is no need to distinguish between natural science and social 
science by the simple fact that the latter is reduced to manifestations of the first. 
 Finally, we stress that our intention is not to express an opinion of the validity of the 
considered approaches. We are interested in defining as correctly as possible the essential aspects 
of  each  peculiar  epistemological a p p r o a c h ,  a n d  i n  l i n k i n g  i t  t o  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  e c o n o m i c  
paradigm and thereafter to a particular framework of marketing problematics in literature. In 
other words, we are trying to characterize the contributions of marketing through the search of the 
fil  rouge  that  links  them  to  its  parent  epistemological  methodology  and  a  certain  economic 
approach, regarded as the framework within which the individual marketing contributions acquire 
concreteness. 
 
2.2  Nomothetic science and historical sciences 
Before turning to the presentation of the proposed taxonomy, it is necessary to clarify the 
important division of sciences in function of the epistemological approaches that may be assigned 
them by scholars. This distinction concerns nomothetic and historical sciences. The distinction 
stems from the fact that traditionally the assertion of science in western thought was inspired by 
the distinction between the subject (who investigates) and the object (to be investigated). This 
distinction was viewed as necessary to conceive genuine knowledge, i.e. scientific knowledge as 
based on a clear distinction between subject and object. The subject, respecting certain rules of 
                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of trends in reductionist science, see Piaget (1970).     7
investigation, could carry out a study of the object without being influenced by its own opinions, 
insuring the validity of the proceedings. A validity that could also be demonstrated by a repetition 
of the investigation-experiment by other parties, thereby assuring an intersubjective verification 
of  the  results  of  scientific  analysis.  Furthermore,  the  distinction  between  subject  and  object 
presumes  that  the  results  that  emerge  from  scientific  analysis  refers  to  "rules"  intended  as 
quantitative relations, invariant in time and space. The lives of objects are independent from the 
analysis  of  the  subject.  The  nomothetic  discipline  is  therefore  configured  as  a  system  of 
hypotheses that, if objectively confirmed, turn into a system of laws of universal value
9. It goes 
without saying that natural sciences are conceived as typically nomothetic and that the successes 
achieved in these disciplines were considered significant enough to profoundly affect the way of 
seeing these sciences and thus becoming the point of reference for all other disciplines. The social 
sciences also tended initially to be built on the nomothetic structure. Certainly, economics, in 
view  of  its  typical  quantitative  curvature,  is  set  according  to  these  canons,  and  similarly, 
sociology  in  Auguste  Comte’s  positivistic  approach.  However,  Marxist  criticism  of  political 
economy and the German historicistic philosophical thought (following the Romantic Movement) 
emphasized how the social sciences cannot be framed in a nomothetic approach and by their very 
nature should be constructed on a necessary connection with history. This debate, which began in 
the second half of the XIX century, is still going on today. We mention it just to remember that 
there are a multitude of positions assumed by the various schools of thought in this field. 
 
2.3  The empiricist approach 
With  reference  to  point  (a)  those  who  rely  on  experience  as  a  source  of  exclusive 
knowledge are usually seen as belonging to the family of empiricism. It assumes that experience 
is both the exclusive source of knowledge and the means of validation of a theory. Thinkers who 
should be regarded as among the most important initiators of this school are: Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626),  Galileo  Galilei  (1564-1642),  John  Locke  (1632-1704)  and  David  Hume  (1711-
1776). Among the salient characterizations of this school is the assumption that the truths that 
man can access are based on the senses and are therefore understandable only through experience. 
                                                 
9 A r o n  ( 1 9 6 7 ) :  “ T h e  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o c e s s  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  s c i e nces  is  to  consider  the  general  characteristics  of  the 
phenomena and to establish regular and necessary relations between them. It tends to build a system of laws or 
relations that are always more general and as far as is possible of a mathematical nature. Newtonian physics is natural 
science’s ideal model”   8
Similarly, the mind is seen as a kind of "tabula rasa" or “blank slate"
10 that in time is filled with 
knowledge acquired through experience. This approach therefore favors knowledge that can be 
acquired  through  evidence  derived  from  experiments.  Another  characteristic  aspect  of  this 
approach consists in the knowledge gained as an "a posteriori" result and then confronted with 
knowledge gained "a priori" which had a wide following in continental Europe starting from 
Descartes and took particular root in German philosophy from Kant (1724-1804) onwards. The 
search for a viable theory according to empiricism favors induction. Inductivism is based on the 
thought that scientific theories are essentially the generalization of observed data, in the sense that 
they are based on a widespread generalization of a large number of concurred observations. This 
approach,  which  can  be  traced  back  to  Francis  Bacon  and  which  received  the  powerful 
endorsement of Isaac Newton, is also the basis of probabilistic validation of a theory. The initial 
inductive  position  was  attenuated  by  scholars  who  continued  to  recognize  themselves  in  the 
empiricism passing from tout court inductivism to probabilistic inductivism
11. This approach is 
also characterized by methodological atomism, in the sense that what can be investigated are 
individual "things", the individual elements of the reality. In more radical versions of empiricism, 
all authentic knowledge falls within the framework of science and every other form of belief is 
none other than a subjective view of an irrelevant assumption (metaphysical). The early version 
of  Political  Economy  (Smith,  Ricardo  and  Marx)  and  the  following  anglo-saxon  economic 
tradition  (from  Stuart  Mill  to  Alfred  Marshall) c a n  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  l e a d i n g  m e m b e r  o f  
empiricism. 
 
2.4  The radical rationalism 
Another distinct epistemological stance opposed to empiricism is the radical rationalism
12 
traditionally traced back to Descartes (1596-1650), according to which, reason is the source of 
knowledge and provides access to the truth through speculation. Human reason is innate and 
                                                 
10 This characterization, which was emphasized by John Locke, is to be seen especially as an opposition both to 
Scholastic  philosophy  which  tended  to  assume  that  man  had  innate  ideas  (innatism)  as  well  as  the  Cartesian 
rationalism that takes reason as the yardstick of truth rather than experience.  
11 We recall that, as a result of subsequent epistemological criticism, the initial inductivism position was attenuated. 
According to Bertrand Russell, induction is necessary to science, but not infallible. Induction can never demonstrate 
the truth of theories, but only increase their probability. Consequently, faith in induction depends on our subjective 
belief and is therefore not scientifically demonstrable. Russell (1912). 
12 Some authors, intending to express a judgment of the scientific validity of these approaches, speak of dogmatic 
rationalism. See for example Goldman (1945). However, we recall again, the research we propose is targeted at the 
presentation of the approaches and has sought to use labels that do not imply evaluative judgments.   9
independent of experience. It uses data of experience as materials that are useful to exercise 
reason,  but  it  is  only  reason  that  is  able  to  express  the  laws  of  nature  using  mathematical 
language. This definition was further strengthened in the subsequent developments of Baruch 
Spinoza  (1632-1677)  and  Gottfried  Wilhelm  Leibniz  (1646-1716).  By  starting  out  from 
fundamental principles that are intuitively identifiable, it is possible, through a deductive process, 
to  arrive  at  knowledge.  Leibniz  thought  that  in  principle,  all  knowledge,  including  scientific 
knowledge, could be achieved only by using reason, although recognizing that in practice this 
was not feasible due to the limitations of every human being. While rationalism exalts the power 
of reason to develop knowledge from itself, empiricism states that reason is powerless when it 
prescinds from data provided by experience. The characterization of the radical rationalism is 
based on the assumption that it is possible to know reality through the thought using intellectual 
principles. According to Descartes and Leibniz knowledge must be based on a priori principles. 
Of course, the rationalistic framework is very articulate and includes different positions, in 
part derived from the development of these first positions, in function of the progress of natural 
sciences, in part derived also from the cultural specificities of different philosophers. Of interest 
to us, among the aspects of the radical rationalism applied to science, is the deductivist approach. 
Assuming some premises that intuition judges as true, called axioms, as is the case in geometry, 
then it is possible to draw some necessary conclusions that have the same degree of truth as the 
premises. For those who recognize themselves in it , such radical rationalism has the merit of 
assuming the knowledge of universal truth. It is about stable certainties, based on the closed and 
self-sufficient  interiority  of  a  logical-mathematical  language.  This  approach  appears  to  show 
significant  affinity  with  the  marginalist  economics  of  the  Lausanne  school
13 t h a t  f u r t h e r  
represents the economic majority paradigm and is therefore of great importance to our taxonomic 
proposal. 
Whilst  France  had  le  siècle  des  Lumières a s  a  f u r t h e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  démarche 
cartesienne, Germany had a double phase, that of Romanticism, where history is seen as the 
manifestation of an absolute principle of the realization of man’s destiny, and that of Kant’s 
                                                 
13 The Lausanne school, whose best-known representatives are Leon Walras (1834-1910) and Wilfredo Pareto (1848-
1923), is opposed to the decidedly more empirical approach of Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). While for Marshall 
adherence to the reality of the descriptive hypotheses of their models (the analysis of partial equilibrium is typical) 
are a prime concern, for the members of the Lausanne school, analysis of general economic equilibrium can be 
disengaged from realistic hypotheses in order to get to a sort of "essence" of the economic facts (pure economics) 
that  represent  the  "axioms"  from  which  to  develop  the  deductive  chains  that  lead  to  the  analysis  of  markets’ 
functioning and identification of their respective equilibria.    10
critique. In the Enlightenment
14 the centre of gravity of knowledge is still represented by reason, 
but the concept of reason is more modest than the Cartesian one and experience also plays an 
important role to express a philosophy of history oriented to progress and to the overcoming of 
the  most  direct  human  needs.  Romanticism  instead  denied  any  value  to  experience  and 
nomothetic  sciences  because  they  cannot  give  the  absolute  truth  sought  by  the  romantic 
movement that entirely relied on an infinite and omnipotent reason expressed in history that 
dominates and constitutes the unity of the world. This transcendent reason is a spiritual force that 
manifests itself in history and that can be perceived because it is embedded in history
15. It is 
difficult  to  imagine  anything  further  from  empiricism  than  romanticism.  Given  its 
characterization in a metaphysical sense, romanticism also seems distant from radical rationalism. 
However, the point of arrival of these two visions is quite similar in that they are representative of 
the possibility to reach an understanding of things in themselves, an understanding of the absolute 
essence of things. In the case of radical rationalism, we move to an objective understanding 
represented by the mathematization of the reality intended as a mechanic system. In the case of 
romanticism instead, attainment of the absolute occurs, represented by the concurrence of the 
universal and the individual, when we move to the recognition of the organic connection of an 
infinite  multiplicity  of  historical  phenomena  as  summarized  in  the  philosophy  of  history 
(historicism). In this sense Romanticism has a very important role because it places the historical 
process at the center of its speculations. An analysis that will be resumed later, although with a 
characterization decidedly distinct from the hermeneutic school on which we will focus shortly. 
 
2.5  The critical rationalism 
The work of Immanuel Kant, who we here see as the initiator of the approach denoted as 
critical rationalism, is extremely vast. We focus our attention on the more epistemological aspects 
that seem of particular importance to us. Kant is accredited with having problematized the limits 
of  knowledge  attainable  with  empiricism.  After  years  of  careful  study  of  Hume’s  work,  the 
philosopher  from  Könisberg  reached  the  conviction  that  empiricism  (which  Kant  denotes  as 
"atomistic") is not able to access true knowledge in that it cannot be constructed as a mere sum of 
                                                 
14 From Montesquieu to the exponents of Encyclopédie; Diderot and D'Alembert via Turgot and Condorcet.  
15 There is also a side of romanticism in which the infinity of the conscience is represented by feelings. In this 
opposite  version,  harshly  criticized  by  G.  W.  F.  Hegel  (1770-1831)  as  an  exponent  of  "rational"  romanticism, 
feelings represent the infinite form and reveal themselves better in art than in philosophy.   11
observations  and  single  assertions.  It  is  necessary  that  these  should  be  structured  in  a  more 
inclusive system, essential to give precise and specific meanings to the single facts incorporated 
by experience. It is interesting to note that Kant’s approach, which we have labeled as critical 
rationalism,  underpins  the  framework  of  the  nomothetic  sciences  but  develops  a  critique  of 
particular importance on the empiricist approach and poses a dialectic between the “totality” of 
the world and the single "fact" that must be solved to build truly scientific knowledge. For Kant, 
the possibility that humans have to communicate and agree in the general categories of thought, 
requires  a  common  sharing  represented  by  synthetic  a  priori  judgments.  According  to  Kant, 
empiricism,  which  in  economics  assumes  Benthamian  utilitarianism,  does  not  have  access  to 
knowledge as it is self-confined in an atomism that sees only the parts and not the whole
16. Kant 
wanted to distance himself also from the position that we have indicated as radical rationalism 
(and which to Kant seemed dogmatic rationalism) which presumes being able to attain knowledge 
of the absolute through reason
17. 
The role of Kant is of particular interest to our taxonomy in that placing the problematic 
relation between the totality and its parts foreshadowed subsequent epistemological positions of 
relevant  interest  such  as  those  developed  in  Gestalt  Psychology  (Piaget  1970),  Structuralism 
(Piaget 1968), the Theory of Systems (Von Bertalanffy 1969), the Postmodern Thought (Lyotard 
1984) and the Thought of Complexity (Luhmann 1984 and Morin 2005). As far as it concerns 
economic theory the critical rationalism is close to “New Austrian School” of von Mises and von 
Hayeck. 
 
2.6   The Weberian approach 
Max Weber’s (1834-1910) vision was developed with specific reference to social sciences, 
and specifically to sociology, Weber assumes for Sociology the research of general laws but 
restricted to a specific period of time because any social science cannot evade intersubjective 
analysis and the findings of experience. He matured his approach through the development of a 
                                                 
16 This kind of argument was stimulated by a multiplicity of subsequent elaborations moving from philosophy to the 
social sciences and sociology in particular. Consider, for example, this piece by Adorno (1969) "The theoretical 
reflections on society as a whole may not be entirely replaced by empiricist investigations, tending to escape from 
them, as spirits do in parapsychological experiments. Every vision of society in its entirety necessarily transcends its 
scattered facts. The construction of the totality has as its first condition a concept of things on the basis of which to 
organize the disparate data". 
17 The readings of Kant’s thought are numerous and often divergent. The analysis carried out by Goldmann (1945) 
seemed particularly acute to us.   12
synthesis that on the one hand, does not fall alongside the sociological positivism drawn up by 
August Comte (1798-1857) and further developed (according to a less radical positivism) by 
Émile  Durkheim  (1858-1917),  but  which,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  end  up  adhering  to  a 
romantic approach in which the knowledge in a social science automatically derives from the 
social nature of man. His entire methodological elaboration is centered on the problem of how to 
achieve a nomothetic scientific development constructed with reference to general laws that do 
not disregard history. To Weber, sociology is neither a simple auxiliary discipline of historical 
sciences nor a science that is legitimated through the recourse to laws of absolute value. The 
solution is to be sought in the construction of scientific knowledge that is empirically verifiable 
and characterized by a general meaning but with reference to a precise historical context. Weber 
considered the vision of the world and the concept of science developed from positivism to have 
failed since the subsequent realities in which man lives (feudalism, capitalism, etc.) represent 
profoundly  different  historical-cultural  realities  that  cannot  be  reprised  or  reconducted  within 
universal laws. It is nevertheless necessary to remain faithful to the principle that founds the 
validity of scientific affirmations not based on over-empiricist presuppositions, as is the case in 
historicism,  but  on  empirically  demonstrable  data.  Weber’s  synthesis  came  about  through  a 
unification of the three stages of scientific work: empirical research, theoretical elaboration and 
generalized interpretation of the collective social formations. To Weber "cultural" sciences are as 
scientific as those termed "exact" and the relation to the values in human actions is the means 
with  which  to  analyze  objectively  a  cultural  reality
18.  In  historical  or  sociological  sciences, 
intuition has a different function from that in natural sciences. The historical and sociological 
propositions concern observable facts, aimed at reaching a defined reality represented by the 
behavior of man in the meaning that the very same agents attribute to it. Every society has its own 
culture and the sociologist tries to understand how man has lived through the countless forms of 
existence  that  become  intelligible  only  in  the  light  of  the  system  of  beliefs  and  knowledge 
specific to the society considered. To construct the historical individuality of a given society, 
Weber proposes the use of the "ideal type" concept. In Max Weber’s comprehensive sociology, 
the ideal type plays a role similar to the hypothetic-deductive model used in the nomothetic 
sciences, i.e. construction subjected to verification. It is "a conceptual framework that combines 
                                                 
18 Aron (1967).   13
certain relations and certain processes of historical life in a cosmos of conceptual connections, in 
itself devoid of contradictions"
19.  
The Weberian approach is characterized by the search for synthesis in the definition of the 
classification of the social sciences. A formulation that seems relevant to us in as much as it is the 
methodological root of a trend of institutional economic studies developed in various countries, 
but which probably had its most significant exponents in American Institutionalism - on which 
more later. It is important to stress that the Weberian approach, while denying the possibility of 
universal  economic  laws,  does  not  recognized  itself  in  the  German  historical  school  which 
Schumpeter subdivided into the "old", represented by Bruno Hildebrand (1812-1878), Wilhelm 
Roscher (1817-1894) and Karl Knies (1821-1898), and the "new" historical school of Gustav 
Schmoller (1838-1917). The approach of the historical school, and in particular, that typified by 
Schmoller, is summarized by Schumpeter in this way: "Schmoller always protested against an 
<isolation> analysis of economic phenomena – he and his followers talked [referring to the neo-
classical economy of a nomothetic structure] of the <isolation method> and claimed that we lose 
their essence as soon as we isolate them. This opinion, of course, was simply the result of their 
intention to nurture the economy exclusively with historical monographs. […] Nothing in the 
cosmos or in social chaos really remains outside of the Schmollerian economy. In principle, if not 
entirely  in  practice,  the  Schmollerian  economist  was  in  fact  a  sociologist  with  a  historicist 
mentality in the widest meaning of the term
20. 
Schumpeter classifies Weber as an exponent of the "very young" historicist school together 
with Werner Sombart (1863-1941). However, it should be noted, as Schumpeter himself declared 
in the History of Economic Analysis "our interest in methodology as such is only limited" and he 
fails to highlight the important methodological differences between the historicist school of strict 
historic-idealistic observance and Weber’s position. 
 
2.7  The hermeneutic approach 
Before trying to characterize this school, it should be noted that the first three approaches 
essentially have as a reference the natural sciences where the search for universal and ahistorical 
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laws is expected
 21. In other words, both empiricism and rationalism depart from the idea of a 
single science to which either the induction or the deduction principles are applied, but both 
pursue the objective of generalization, or rather the search for applicable laws to a multiplicity of 
situations and moments. The measure of the validity or, if preferred, of the hierarchy of a law is 
given by its own degree of generalization. The more general a law is (in the sense that it had 
general validity) the higher is its rank
22 within the scientific framework. Therefore, failing to 
define and validate highly general laws in the realm of social sciences, meant that social sciences 
were positioned on a lower rank than the natural laws. Nevertheless, according to an approach 
that intends to implement a nomothetic program also for the social sciences, social scientists must 
deal with the "social facts" considered as things that can be subjected to positive analysis through 
the same methodology used in the natural sciences. The typical exponent of this reductionist 
program in social sciences, and specifically in sociology, is Auguste Comte (1798-1857). He 
speaks explicitly of sociology intended as "socio-physical" in that it is constructed with laws 
similar to those of the physical world
23 and targeted at the study of social behavior that can be 
defined in terms of manifested, observable and physically ascertainable actions. This program 
seemed extremely radical and unacceptable to an idealistic cultural tradition such as the German 
one, which tended to interpret not only history, but also the world, according to a historicist 
perspective. It is not surprising therefore, that in the German-speaking world there was, we could 
say almost in reaction, a strong reaffirmation of  historicism in the definition of the methodo-
logical statute of the social sciences, thanks also to the fact that the positivist scientific program, 
in Comte’s formulation, appeared to be denoted by significant weaknesses. The historical school 
of economics, as previously mentioned, can effectively be seen as the attempt to give a historic 
answer to the construction of a methodology to be applied to the social sciences. However, if 
Comte’s positivism was unbalanced on the one hand, then on the other so was Hildebrand and 
Schmoller’s historicist school. Both because applied to economics, that is to say, to the social 
sciences  for  which  the  search  for  universal  laws  then  seemed  more  justified  with  respect  to 
                                                 
21 This connotation is certainly a little too coarse with reference to the critical rationalist approach. However, there is 
no doubt that as regards Kant, the objective to beat was empiricist atomism and Benthamian utilitarianism and, 
secondly, at his time social sciences were still treated with a reductionist and mechanistical view. 
22 Marsonet (2005). 
23 In this respect, we also note that years later, in the XX century, “physical economics" is spoken of. In Italy, an 
exponent  of  this  approach  is  Palomba  (1948),  more  recently  instead  "econophysics"  is  spoken  of.  In  France 
LaRouche (1998) proposed a re-edition of physical economics. See also Mirowski (1989).   15
sociology  for  example,  and  because  the  historicist  program  would  have  needed  a  powerful 
methodology to counter the then prevailing marginalist school, which its exponents instead did 
not affront, unlike Weber with particular reference to sociology. The historicist school was also 
left open to significant criticism that did not fail to arrive from German economists who could 
also argue with the neoclassic economists on specific points, but who fully recognized the need to 
preserve  the  nomothetic  statute to  economics.  This  is  how  the  famous  "strife  over  methods" 
(Methodenstreit)  came  about  which  saw  the  Austrian  economists  Carl  Menger  and  Böhm-
Bawerk
24 marshal against economic historicism. 
The  hermeneutic  approach  in  turn  can  be  seen  as  an  effort  by  the  German  culture  to 
elaborate a response against the "alleged objective knowledge of science”. A program that found 
undoubted nurturing in the crisis that traversed the economic and social nomothetic thought in the 
first  half  of  the  20th  century,  traversed  by  two  world  wars  and  the  solidity  of  the  laws  of 
economic science deeply shaken by the crisis of the late 1920s in the USA, but then extending to 
the whole western economy. The hermeneutic school traces a clear distinction between natural 
and social sciences and is only concerned by the latter. A peculiar feature of social sciences is that 
they may not be reduced to facts (even if social ones) in that those same facts, when placed in 
different contexts assume, or can assume, completely different meanings. According to Hans 
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), the most representative figure of the hermeneutic approach
25, social 
sciences  and  natural  sciences  are  radically  different,  since  the  first  inevitably  depend  on  the 
interpretative process – typically human – of the significant behavior and of the social practices 
on which such behavior is based. In other words, natural science holds with causal objective 
processes, while the social sciences concern significant activities and practices. Only the causal 
processes may be explained and described objectively; human activities and practices require 
interpretation  and  understanding.  In  summary,  the  explanation  is  the  objective  of  the  natural 
sciences while understanding is the aim of the social sciences
26. 
The hermeneutic problem (intended as a theory  of  interpretation  of  classical  texts)  had 
already been dealt with by Friedich Schleiermarcher (1768-1834), who, however, had a vision of 
hermeneutics that was still a long way off from the traits that it assumed with Gadamer. While for 
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25 Gadamer had numerous precursors in the context of historicism, among these, the most important was probably 
Dilthey (1833-1911), while Schleiermacher (1768-1834) had already used the term “hermeneutic”. 
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the former, hermeneutics allowed understanding the text of an author in the most authentic way 
possible,  through  a  return  to  the  past  that  allowed  reliving  the  historical  basis  on  the 
presupposition of the text examined, for the latter this operation was not feasible because of the 
impossiblity to return to the past in an objective way, since the present and contingent existence 
of man is the place where a pre-understanding is necessarily formed (stratified knowledge that 
characterizes  the  understanding  of  a  present  state)  of  the  reality  that  will  also  necessarily 
contaminate the idea of the past. For Gadamer it is therefore impossible to return objectively to 
the  past,  as  this  generates  necessarily  a  pre-understanding  that  makes  the  vision  of  the  past 
something  different  from  the  past  itself.  This  is  how  a  hermeneutic  circle
27  is  formed:  the 
understanding of a historical text is conditioned by a pre-understanding, which is determined by 
all  relations  of  understanding  and  pre-understanding  from  the  past.  The  understanding  of  a 
historic moment, therefore, is the result of this unceasing circular stratification of concepts that 
constantly form on themselves, starting from the preceding concepts.  
We have therefore arrived at a completely antithetical position to empiricism. In the social 
sciences, according to Gadamer’s approach, human reason is not a tabula rasa, on the contrary, it 
is a tabula plena, full of pre-judgments (in the sense of judgments that precede a careful analysis 
of social issues to be analyzed) that may result as justified or unjustified in subsequent analysis, 
but  which  are  nevertheless  not  eliminable  and  the  necessary  medium  through  which  the 
individual is connected to the social totality. If in atomism there are first the facts, which must be 
kept  rigorously  separate  from  interpretations,  in  the  hermeneutic view of social sciences this 
separation is totally illusory as stated by Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) assertion: "against 
positivism, which stops at the phenomena <there are only facts> - I should say: no, actually there 
are no facts but only interpretations"
28. As seen in the hermeneutic approach, we have a re-
proposition of questions already raised by Kant on the relationship between "form and content" or 
between "totality and its parts", but here the synthesis is profoundly different in that it is totality 
that  gives  meaning  to  the  parts,  a  position  that a l s o  r e c a l l s  s o m e  o f  the  structuralism    and 
functionalism positions.  
 
                                                 
27 In the introduction to Verità e Metodo, Vattimo, drawing up a short summary of the hermeneutic circle in the 
history of philosophy, specifies that "In its simplest form the hermeneutic circle means that the parts of a text can 
only be understood in the light of the whole, but the whole can be understood only in light of the parts". Vattimo 
(1983). 
28 Referred to by Foriero (1993).    17
3.  The level of the economic theory 
3.1.  From Political Economy to Economics 
The 2nd level taxonomic classification, that of economic theory, can be usefully formulated 
starting out from the relationship of the various economic paradigms with the natural sciences. 
Economics, but also law, sociology, anthropology, psychology, etc., must therefore define its own 
field in relation, on the one hand, to the natural sciences and, on the other, to history. Assimilating 
economics to natural sciences means assuming an economic science that aims at a universalistic 
program where history is an accident. In this perspective, if economics wants to be a science, on 
par with the natural sciences, it must get rid of history to point to forms of knowledge that have 
universal validity. If instead the choice is in favor of marking a distance between natural and 
social sciences, the necessity to build new criteria of epistemological coherence for the social 
sciences becomes clear. 
Initially  economics  was  born  as  political  economy  and  this  distinction  means  that  the 
perspective in which to place the reflections of the first economists tends to frame this science 
within a socially and historically determined framework. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of  the  Wealth  of  Nations  by  Adam  Smith  (1732-1790)  was  published  in  1776  and,  strictly 
speaking, falls much more within a legal and social than scientific framework. This approach was 
also maintained by subsequent classical authors such as David Ricardo (1772-1823) and further 
emphasized by Karl Marx (1818-1883). However, we can say that due to the effect of Marxist 
criticism, liberal economists were gradually inclined to mute the image and the name of Political 
Economy as a social science in order to highlight the nomothetic aspects of their research, which 
meant a shift in the labels (but not only) from Political Economy to Economics. To John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873) this tendency seemed clear, for example he privileged a social science approach 
as regards aspects of the distribution of wealth and a natural science approach to the issues of 
production of wealth. From the methodological point of view, Mill distances himself from rigid 
empiricism, both for the specificity of economic problems and because utilitarianism of man is 
knowable by the researcher involved in the subject of human feelings through psychological 
introspection. It is interesting that Mill is credited as the first theorizer of homo economicus, even 
though he used neither this label nor the more common Anglo-Saxon economic man
29. However 
                                                 
29 According to Persky (1995), the first use of the term economic man goes back to a J. K. Ingram publication, A 
History of Political Economy, 1888, the Homo economicus label instead spread with Pareto’s use in 1906 in his 
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in Mill (1835), economic man is clearly indicated as a useful abstraction assumed by political 
economy  through  an  arbitrary  definition  that  considers  this  aspect  as  relevant  only  for  the 
purposes of utilitarian behavior: “A being who inevitably does that by which he may obtain the 
greatest amount of necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour 
and physical self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of knowledge”. It 
was through the Lausanne school that the concept of economic man became the cornerstone of 
the construction of pure economics, which we will shortly resume. 
Another  particularly  significant  aspect  of  Mill’s  position  concerns  the  complexity  of 
economic phenomena that he considers "hidden" by a myriad of accidental aspects. It is therefore 
necessary to dig deep in order to discover the true causes of economic phenomena. Mill (1936) 
argued that the complexity of the economic reality should be investigated through a process of 
organization  of  research  into  disciplines  and  sub-disciplines  and  furthermore,  considering  a 
specific  issue,  that  it  needs  to  be  dealt  with  first  through  an  analysis  that  breaks  down  the 
individual problem into its more simple components, followed by a process of synthesis that 
recomposes the overall framework: “When an effect depends upon a concurrence of causes, those 
causes must be studied one at a time, and their laws separately investigated, if we wish, through 
the causes, to obtain the power of either predicting or controlling the effect since the law of the 
effect, is compounded of the laws of all the causes which determine it”. 
Returning to the methodological approaches already summarized, we can state that Mill’s 
position is characterized by a rather tempered empiricism. He adopted, as it was natural in the 
Anglo-Saxon  culture  of  the  time,  a  nomothetic  vision  of  economics,  but  his  recall  to  the 
complexity and the intertwinement of the economic contributory causes on a single effect shows 
that he in some way intended to take account of a complex socio-economic reality but naturally 
he shrinks from the idea of totality, evoked in some way by radical rationalism, and emphasized 
above  all  by  critical  rationalism.  Also  because  Mill  assumes  that  the  disaggregation  and 
consolidation of contributory causes of economic phenomena can be made on an additive basis
30 
(the whole is equal to the sum of the parts). At the same time, it is clear that Mill preferred an 
approach that privileges adherence of the theory to the economic reality. Abstraction is necessary 
but entails a simplification of the reality that should be recomposed, if wanting to reach a genuine 
explanation of the functioning of the system, not just economic but also social. Indeed, Mill 
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conceived a social superscience that he called "ethnology" whose task was to summarize in a 
single theoretical framework the scientific theories developed in the different social disciplines: 
economics, political science, morality science, science of religion, etc
31. Mill’s approach could be 
seen as the approach of reference, under an epistemological profile, of Anglo-Saxon economic 
thought,  both  of  Jevons  "first"  marginalism,  but  also  that  of  Marshall,  for  whom  unlike 
marginalism and especially that of the Lausanne school, the concept of homo economicus was at 
most only a reference and the adherence to reality of the assumptions in economic models was a 
precise stronghold to maintain. 
In the second half of the XIX century, economic research began to differentiate between 
that professed in the Anglo-Saxon world and that professed in continental Europe. In the first 
case, it tended to maintain an "applied" approach based on theories that seek to minimize the 
process  of  abstraction  and  simplification  of  reality  to  construct  theories  that  maintain  the 
maximum degree of adherence to the economic reality as perceived by normal subjects in their 
daily normal economic practice. In continental research, especially due to the effect of Walras’ 
and then Pareto’s work in search of "pure economics", that is to say, divested of all the daily 
accidents to try to find the essence of economics: the pure version of the economic mechanisms 
that only in this form may take the structure of universal scientific laws. In the Lausanne School 
vision’s, the option in favor of pure economics is also legitimated by the possibility to use the 
language of mathematicians in a much wider sense, since the framework of reference is stripped 
of every phenomenon considered secondary. Against this, in Anglo-Saxon economic vision’s 
maintained in the first part of the XX century by Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), the mathematical 
instrument was a tool that could only be usefully for formal verifications, but Marshall himself 
recommended be eliminated from reasoning and from the economic description to remain as 
close as possible to the everyday economic language and experience. At the same time, Marshall 
had a more limited perspective in his analysis (partial equilibrium) because he intended to attain 
the characterization of the complex economic mechanism as the sum of markets, each of which is 
characterized by its own real specificity. 
Instead,  the  particular  curvature  of  the  analysis  carried  out  by  Walras  aimed  at  the 
simultaneous co-determination of the equilibrium not only of a single market, but also of an entire 
economic system. This type of formal solution appears not only rigorous from the point of view 
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of its internal structure, but also elegant, in that it is conceptually simple and at the same time 
general. It appears especially politically correct from the perspective of a capitalist economy that 
theorizes the possibility to attain a configuration of equilibrium and maximum efficiency in every 
market. It seemed the definitive answer to the criticisms of Marxist derivations and knew lasting 
success that was to be questioned only by the analyses of the oligopolistic market structures
32, but 
especially by the economic crisis of 1929. 
This  approach  seems  substantially  faithful  in  pursuing  the  assumptions  of  radical 
rationalism. The economic system is comparable in its pure form to a complexity of legislation 
having the same cogency as natural laws
33. Towards the end of the XIX century, the legitimacy of 
economics as a nomothetic science implies a new term: from Political Economy to Economics, by 
taking on an analytic-deductive definition that expunges historical references in order to find 
"pure", "general" and "universal" laws. It is interesting to note how this construction prescinds 
from any empirical verification, both because reality is something that follows the laws of pure 
economics only in the trend, superimposing a multiplicity of accidental phenomena on them and 
because it is, in essence, an axiomatic construction that is validated by mathematical calculation 
and  by  a  criterion  of  internal  consistency.  This  new  perspectives  requires  therefore,  even  if 
undeclared, to eliminate as over-structural and non-determinant everything that would in fact 
make  it  impossible  to  proceed  with  a  determination  of  market  equilibria  (price  and  quantity 
exchanged for each market). The calculation of equilibrium thus becomes the tendential point of 
arrival of each market if it were left free to operate reproducing a perfectly competitive situation 
everywhere. 
In part this curvature of economic thought  was  formed  by  the  search  for  a  completely 
scientific  economics  statute  that  guaranteed  its  authority  in  a  similar  manner  to  the  natural 
sciences, but also as a reaction to contrary types of economic settings, developed particularly in 
Germany  and  Austria,  where  a  historicist  orientation  prevailed,  ideologically  adverse  to 
empiricism and especially to positivism, but just as unbalanced as them. Suffice to say that, 
according to this historicist approach, political economy, as a moral science, should not have 
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conceded to the mathematical language. A second conditioning aspect stemmed from the attitude 
of the other sciences towards economics. Consider, for example, that even scholars of the highest 
level, such as Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) in Italy, refused to accept the status of "science" for 
economics on the basis of a historicist principle. It was therefore quite inevitable that to these 
historicist positions other were placed in opposition by “pure” economists. For example, Vilfredo 
Pareto (1848-1923), Leon Walras’ successor to the chair of political economy in Lausanne, in 
direct controversy with Croce, defined the new economy as "rational mechanics" where logical 
coherence and formal rigor of analysis prevail through a wide use of the mathematical tool
34. 
Leon Walras also, in what was probably his last scientific contribution, traced a close parallel 
between  economics  and  mechanics
35.  Basically,  today  we  also  have  the  distinction  between 
"applied" and "pure" economics, even if these two labels are no longer used, the first includes the 
majority of the approaches adopted in microeconomics and in industrial economics, while the 
second tends to converge in the majority of studies of mathematical economics and econometrics. 
 
3.2.  The Chicago School 
There  are  of  course  many  other  formulations a n d  a m o n g s t  t h e s e ,  t h e  a p p r o a c h  o f  t h e  
Chicago  school  must  be  pointed  out.  Particularly  representative  of  this  approach  is  Milton 
Friedman  (1912-2006)  who  also  studied  specific  epistemological  issues
36.  Friedman  can  be 
considered an exponent of a typically empiricist approach, in a certain sense an even more radical 
empiricist than the empiricist economists of the 19th century such as Mill and Marshall. The 
position of Friedman may be summarized by reference to three aspects, a) firstly Friedman was a 
strong supporter of the rational behavior of actors, the concept of homo economicus not only has 
the heuristic function of tracing the behavior of a subject, if put in the position of being able to 
make a decision in a rational sense, but represents an interpretative stronghold of his approach 
and a faithful description of the human behavior. Many of his arguments against economists who 
supported an alternative position were oriented to demonstrating the rational behavior of subjects 
even in the face of behavior that others judge to be economically clearly irrational; b) the second 
aspect concerns the validation of economic theories on the sole basis of their predictive capacity. 
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In this sense, value is denied to the realism of the assumptions in the definition of a theory
37. 
Finally  c),  where  it  should  be  indicated,  in  close  connection  to  the  previous  point,  that  the 
devaluation of realism of hypotheses places Friedman among "instrumentalists", i.e. among those 
who deny the possibility that science can and should devote itself to discovering the true structure 
(natural and social) of the world. Theories are only useful instruments to interpret the world and 
to make forecasts on future events
38. 
 
3.3.  Macroeconomics 
The  methodological  positions  of  pure  economics  were  generally  abandoned  with  the 
constitution of the macroeconomic body of studies developed by John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946).  Keynes  substantially  maintained  the  methodological  attitude  of M i l l  a n d  M a r s h a l l  a s  
regards the concreteness of analysis but applied to economic categories of an aggregate nature, 
considering not so much the choices of a single individual, but the aggregate effect of choices of 
entire categories of subjects. Collective subjects of the classic economist and Marxist elaborations 
were not considered (the classes, the capitalists, the proletarians, etc.) but rather the aggregate 
consumption, the aggregate investment, and the aggregate savings. This elaboration constituted 
an attempt to reconsider economic science following the effects of the great crisis of the 1930's, 
which seriously undermined economic science’s image
39. The basic objective therefore changed, 
it was no longer about the determination of the configurations of market equilibria, given the 
economic  events  that  had  destroyed  the  equilibrium  myth,  but  an  attempt  to  investigate  the 
conditions necessary for the growth of the economic system and the reduction of unemployment. 
The  prestige  of  macroeconomic  studies  arising  from  Keynes’  contributions  and  from  the 
successes connected to the public intervention aimed at economic development and the fight 
against unemployment had not so much the role of affirming a new methodological paradigm, but 
rather to set aside the scientific program of pure economics, reaffirming the traditional Anglo-
Saxon approach. 
 
3.4.  Praxeology 
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(1953). 
38 Guala (2002). 
39 Consider that his most important work The general theory of employment, interest and money, is dated 1936.   23
In a contemporary phase with the emergence of macroeconomics in continental Europe, a 
new Austrian school emerged and especially the contributions offered by Ludgwig von Mises 
(1881-1973). During his economic training phase, this scholar experienced the harsh conflict of 
positions represented by the Methodenstreit that saw the confrontation between scholars of the 
nomothetic method and scholars of the historicist approach. His own approach was in line with 
the first vein although with some autonomous and original developments. On the one hand, he 
claimed  the  need  for  an  exclusively  deductive  approach,  drawing  him  close  to  the  previous 
exponents  of  pure  economics,  but  he  vehemently  denied  that  economics  was  looking  to  be 
accredited in direct contiguity with the natural sciences: “On the one side he warned that the 
theoretical  considerations  were  of  utmost  importance  for  science  and  for  economics  and  by 
emphasizing deduction, he intended to ensure that it would not be forgotten; on the other hand, 
the  attempts  by  economists  to  imitate  the  physical  sciences  irritated  him.  He  wanted  to 
strenuously  conserve  theoretical  autonomy  of  the  social  sciences  and  a  deductively  oriented 
methodology would have prevented quantitative techniques (the use of which Mises saw as an 
attempt to ape the natural sciences) from earning too much space within economic science"
40. 
However, it should be noted that von Mises’ approach had a strong point of contact with the 
approach previously indicated as pure economics and with the radical rationalist approach, since 
he  assigned  a  fundamental  role  to  a  priori  judgment:  "The  knowledge  obtained  from  purely 
deductive reasoning is also creative and opens the mind to previously precluded fields”. The 
significant task of a priori reasoning is, on the one hand, to highlight what is implicit in the 
various categories, conceptualizations and premises and, on the other, to demonstrate what they 
do not implicate"
41. 
But at the same time von Mises detached himself from radical rationalism, not only for the 
suspicion with which he judged the mathematical elaboration, as much as for the subsequent 
econometric  developments,  which  from  the  1940s onwards  experienced  a phase of particular 
development and prestige for its possible applications in the macroeconomic field. The most 
characteristic aspects of this orientation, for which the label "New Austrian School"
42 could also 
be  used,  was  to  define  economics  as  an  important  discipline  of  the  more  vast  praxeological 
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science. Praxeology is the science that has as its task to explain human action in its various 
economic and social manifestations. The characteristic aspect of human action is that it is directed 
to a purpose. The purposes in themselves are not subject to investigation, but their attainment 
requires  the  use  of  means.  Praxeology  and  its  specialized  branch:  economics,  is  specifically 
oriented to the rational use of means. It follows that the behaviors of subjects are necessarily 
rational in the use of the means. Economics tells us nothing of the validity of purposes or the 
reasons of the action, but it is able to interpret the way in which human actions are embodied. 
This may seem to behold a return to pure economics but this is not the case because von Mises’ 
economics  takes  account  of:  a)  aspects  neglected  by  the  uncertainty  that  characterizes  the 
reference  horizon  of  subjects  and  b)  the  role  played  by  the  elapsing  of  time.  This  does  not 
however imply entering into a historicist optic, since he denied any role to concepts such as "the 
spirit of the era" or "the climate of events" that are part of the baggage of the classic historicist 
approach to economics
43. Friedrich HA. Von Hayek (1899-1992) carried on from Von Mises with 
some changes. He stressed particularly the methodological subjectivism of the Austrian approach 
and warned economists against the risk of an abuse of reason
44 that he ascribed to Cartesian 
radical  rationalism  and  to  the  positivistic  approach  in  general.  He  declared  his  adhesion  to 
Popperian falsificationism
45, so we can assume he represents an application in economics of the 
critical rationalism derived form the Kantian view. 
We conclude this concise presentation of praxeology citing the fact that in the literature we 
also  know  a  different  version  of p r a x e o l o g y  t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  coincided  with  studies  started 
during the Second World War in the United States and listed as Operation Research
46. In this 
field, the focus was also concentrated on more efficient use of means, but while in von Mises’ 
praxeology, the study was intended to be of a positive nature, Operations Research’s approach 
was typically normative and substantiated in a set of mathematical, statistical and econometric 
tools applied to the resolution of problems of choice. As can be seen, it was an approach that was 
completely  antithetical  to  that  theorized  by  von  Mises  and  which  falls  instead  into  the  von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) subject of study. 
                                                 
43 T h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i v e r g e n c e  a m o n g  s c h o l a r s  c o ncerning  the possibility  of  entering  Albert  Friedrich  von 
Hayek’s development into the furrow of von Mises. 
44 Von Hayek (1952). 
45 Popper (1963, 1968). 
46 The term praxeology used in a homologous sense for Operations Research was used mainly in France in an effort 
to avoid Anglo-Saxon linguistics. See Caude and Moles (1964) and Kaufmann (1967).   25
 
3.5.  Bounded rationality and satisficing 
The Chicago school’s and Milton Friedman’s approach, with his fervent defense of the 
principle of rationality in behavior, although with a very different curvature from that of von 
Mises, did not fail to raise strong methodological objections from many economists. Among these 
opponents, Herbert A. Simon (1916-2001) played a leading role with his development of the 
Bounded Rationality approach. Simon claimed that there are no conditions for rational behavior 
for subjects in a situation characterized by uncertainty and incomplete information. The subject 
has  teleological  rationality  objectives,  some  personal  reading  capacity  of  the  environmental 
characteristics  (cognitive  limitations)  and  has  developed  over  time,  on  the  basis  of  past 
experience, some subjective expectations on the attainability of the objectives. From the moment 
that he is subjected to a series of constraints and stimuli from the environment in  which he is 
immersed, he reacts with an interactive search for a solution (problem solving) that meets his 
expectations. This heuristic behavior foresees a downward or upward revision of expectations in 
the light of the results of the research process. The search ends when the expectations have been 
attained (satisficing attitude) without reaching a situation of optimization of choice because no 
conditions exists to do so. 
Understanding this position gives of a much more social and psychological tinge to the 
economic behavior of subjects and while moving within a framework that stresses experience, the 
nomothetic valence fades away the significance of theories and ambitions to find "universal" laws 
without however entering into the "historicist school" perspective. Simon attacks supporters of  
perfect rationality and choice optimization criticizing the “determinism of situation”: "The classic 
theory  of  omniscient  rationality  is  individually  simple  and  charming  […].  All  the  predictive 
power comes from having characterized the form of the environment in which the behavior takes 
place.  The  environment,  combined  with  the  assumptions  of  perfect  rationality,  completely 
determines the behavior"
47. In this way, however, consideration of the different psychologies of 
actors and their cognitive capacity for analysis is neglected. Subjects may have different levels of 
propensity to risk, different systems of information gathering and different levels of expectations. 
It is therefore not possible to reason in terms of laws, but rather in terms of rules that must be 
classified according to concrete situations. We could say that for Simon and the great majority of 
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economists of the second half of the twentieth century, a sort of "weak thought" prevailed, based 
on hypothetical-deductive concatenations to be validated with the verification of experience
48. 
This approach to research did not, however, produce "laws" as previously hoped for, but useful 
heuristic rules. These rules even if partial and imperfect, could be refined over time taking into 
account the development of historical situations. History was important, but a historicist view was 
rejected. Another aspect of particular importance of Simon’s approach concerns the principle of 
rationality  which  still  applied  but  which  moved  from  optimizing  rationality  to  procedural 
rationality. The players try to approach rationality teleologically, but they do so by applying rules 
of procedure applied to the objective of achieving a satisfactory result.  
 
3.6.  American Institutionalism 
At the end of the XIX century, especially in the US, an anti-empiricist version of economics 
matured, which while rejecting a Marxist type approach did not scrimp on criticism of capitalism 
and in particular of American capitalism, whose predatory behavior, encouraged by a process of 
unprecedented  monopolistic  concentration  in  many  key  industries,  was  denounced.  This 
approach,  termed  institutionalism  (Institutional  Economy)  takes  into  account  the  economic 
behavior generated by a variety of phenomena with strong economic characterizations, such as 
the  juridical  sphere  for  example.  Among  the  most i m p o r t a n t  e x p o n e n t s  o f   this  approach  are 
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and John R. Commons (1862-1945). Their approach has divergent 
connotations that we however address with a single label in that both take the historic connotation 
of economic institutions fully into account and use a methodology that is decidedly alien from 
pure economic theories. Veblen’s most noted work is his 1899: The Theory of the Leisure Class: 
an Economic Study of Institutions. Here we have an analysis inspired by evolutionary economics 
that characterizes Veblen’s methodological approach which makes economic behavior derive not 
from  forms  of  individual  choice  as  coeval  marginalism  does,  but  from  forms  of  social 
organization  and  therefore  typically  connoted  in  a  historical  sense.  This  aspect  is  especially 
stressed  also  in  Commons’  1934:  Institutional  Economics.  Commons  is  best  known  for 
developing an analysis of collective actions that take shape through institutions. In Commons' 
view,  institutional  economics  added  collective  control  of  individual  transactions  to  existing 
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economic theory: “Transactions intervene between the labor of the classic economists and the 
pleasures of the hedonic economists, simply because it is society that controls access to the forces 
of  nature,  and  transactions  are,  not  the  ‘exchange  of  commodities’,  but  the  alienation  and 
acquisition, between individuals, of the rights of property and liberty created by society, which 
must  therefore  be  negotiated  between  the  parties  concerned  before  labor  can  produce,  or 
consumers can consume, or commodities be physically exchanged”
49. The institutional approach 
can be considered an application of the Weberian view to economics. American Institutionalism 
represents an intermediate position between a nomothetic (astoric) concept of economics and the 
hermeneutic approach to economics followed by the Rhetoric approach. 
 
3.7.  The rhetoric approach  
We  conclude  our  review  of  epistemological  positions  by  mentioning  also  the  rhetoric 
approach (Rhetoric Economics) of Deirdre McCloskey (1983, 1988). The author points out that 
(fortunately, in his view) economists systematically go beyond the theoretical areas set by the 
epistemology that they declare to profess, because if indeed they were to keep to the rules dictated 
by empirical evidence they would have very few subjects to study and even less things to say
50. 
Essentially, this recalls a sharp turn in economics that abandoned a nomothetic perspective (called 
by McClosky: “modernism”) to move to a historicist approach and to an analysis and exposition 
of theories in narrative terms. Without enlarging on the position of this author, we can say that 
this is clearly a hermeneutic approach that refuses a nomothetic scientific program for economics 
and assumes that economic models are metaphors. The right economic statement is the statement 
able to get the consensus of the people and the mean to do that is represented by rethoric. 
 
4.  The phenomenology of the marketing approaches 
4.1.  The disciplinary constitution of marketing 
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economics, operationalism, behaviorism, and other positivistic enthusiasms of the 1930s and 1940s. They believe 
these are the only grounds for science but in their actual scientific work they argue about the aptness of scientific 
methaphors, the relevance of historical precedence, the persuasiveness of introspections, the power of authority, the 
charm of symmetry, the claims of morality. Crude positivism labels such issues “meaningless” or “non-scientific” or 
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It  is  not  easy  to  identify  a  historic  moment  or  a  date  to  which  to  ascribe  the  birth  of 
marketing, essentially due to the heterogeneity of content that this discipline presents. Today we 
are accustomed to thinking of marketing as a scientific discipline divided into several branches, 
the subject of the proliferation cited at the beginning of this work, branches that sometimes seem 
or are perceived as distant from the characteristic themes of economics by virtue of the greater or 
lesser recourse to the contents of other disciplines, typically psychology, statistics and sociology. 
In reality, it can be said that the birth of the array of studies, that converged in marketing, was a 
typical economic problem of resource allocation; in fact the roots of marketing can be traced 
back, on the one hand, to the statistical practices of gathering socio-demographic parameter data, 
which as regards economics are essentially directed at logistical savings
51, on the other hand in 
the  practices  of  product  communication  (advertising),  which  in  a  common  sense  has  always 
existed but its systematic study can be more realistically attributed to the second half of the XIX 
century
52.The  baptism  of  the  discipline,  however,  is  usually  designated  to  the  academic  year 
1904-1905,  when  the  term  "marketing"  appeared  in a  c o u r s e  h e l d  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
Pennsylvania (Weld, 1941). Before that date, however, the University of Michigan and Ohio 
proposed "distribution" and “retail” courses (Maynard, 1941), subjects that would be channeled 
into marketing as it is now commonly understood. No doubt that in this early period marketing 
studies were enrolled within the wide empiricism movement and privileged and inductive point of 
view.  
1915  was  the  year  of  the  constitution  of  the  National  Association  of  Teachers  of 
Advertising (NATA), founded during the annual meeting of the Association of Advertising Clubs 
of the World; thereafter in 1931 in New York, the American Marketing Society (AMS) was 
founded.  Five  years  later,  in  1936,  NATA  changed  its  name  to  the  National  Association  of 
Marketing Teachers (NAMT) and together with AMS published the Journal of Marketing for the 
first time. A year later, the two associations merged into the American Marketing Association, 
which is still an important reference point for the discipline today. 
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From the earliest "ante-litteram” market research to today, the use of statistics has had a 
leading role in marketing, also evolving from its use as a collection and descriptive analysis tool 
to a tool for the validation of assumptions and formulations of theories, to the point that today the 
adoption of advanced statistical techniques is widely present in marketing articles and, in some 
cases, constitutes a discriminating criterion for the selection of work to be published. However 
today, as has already been  stated at the beginning, marketing has taken on a far more diverse 
nature  not  only  with  reference  to  issues  dealt  with  within  each  approach  but  also  in  the 
heterogeneity referring to the way in which these same issues are dealt with. In this section, we 
will  try  to  highlight  the  distinctions  between  the  different  strands  and  the  epistemological 
arrangement  that  is  the  subject  of  the  first  part  of  this  article.  The  strands  that  seem  most 
significant are the following: 
-  positive vs. normative marketing 
-  micromarketing, macromarketing, exchange marketing; 
-  strategic marketing and operative marketing; 
-  marketing management and relationship marketing; 
-  Fordism and post-Fordist marketing; 
-  postmodern marketing, school of critical theory, hermeneutic school  
-  experiential marketing; 
-  service-driven marketing; 
 
4.2.  “Positive” marketing vs. “normative” marketing  
As stated, the first orientation in the constitution of the economic discipline in the 18th 
and in the first part of the 19
th century, strongly felt the need to emulate the addresses of the 
natural and nomothetic sciences. Marketing, as a scientific discipline, was structured in a later 
phase and fell into a specialized thematic area of a neoclassic mould within enterprise theory. In 
fact, the most relevant epistemological references are those of the managerial disciplines. The 
Scientific Management in the United States and the European versions of this side of research, 
represented by the Fayol studies in France and by the Rationalisierung movement in Germany, 
had  by  now  gained  great  visibility  and  proposed t h e  p a r a d i g m  o f  r e f e rence  in  the  rational 
behavior  field  of  studies.  Marketing  studies  consequently  tended  to  assume  the  form  of  the 
rationalist statute with the decidedly normative slant inherent in these approaches. At the end of   30
the  1950s  however,  Vance  Packard,  a  journalist  working  for  the  publishing  house  Collier, 
published a book dedicated to the persuasive practices that in his view should be applied in 
advertising  in  large  companies,  aided  by  big  advertising  agencies
53.  The  volume  had 
extraordinary success and strengthened the predatory image that large American businesses had 
acquired from the second half of the XIX century and labeled as robber barons. This publication, 
rightly or not, projected a dark shadow on marketing research and advertising practices and posed 
the question among academics of whether the discipline should or should not have an exclusively 
positive orientation and whether the normative approach should retain scientific statute. The issue 
was resolved in a positive way both in terms of the scientific legality of the normative approach 
and  scientific  validity  of  this  approach.  The  aspect  that  interests  us  is  that  the  approach 
characterized  by  a  positive  type  of  analysis  recalled  an  epistemology  that  was  substantially 
different  from  the  normative.  In  the  first  case,  the  type  of  skills  required  for  the 
description/interpretation  of  the  behavior  of  subjects  postulated  the  use  of  the  psychological 
sciences, whilst in the second case the conceptual basis of reference derived from managerial 
sciences.  
In the USA, at the beginning of the 1950s, psychology was deeply influenced by the 
theories and experimentations of Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990), professor of Psychology 
at Harvard from 1958 to 1974, who became the supporter of an approach known as Radical 
Behaviorism that postulated human behavior as the result of the interaction of the biological 
nature  and  environmental  stimuli  and  excluded  the  use  of  a  deductivist  approach
54.  It  is 
unnecessary to stress that this approach was very far from the conceptual apparatus of normative 
marketing  analyses  that  drew  scientific  reference  from  deductive  schemes  centered  on 
assumptions  of  rational  behavior  of  subjects. T h e  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h ese  two  positions  drew 
marketing  towards  the  field  of  the  radical  rationalism  of  marginalist  economics.  The  first 
consolidation of Marketing as a science was not born in view of empiricism but in view of radical 
rationalism. Historically, this led to a change in the course of marketing studies in a strictly 
normative sense and in the 1960s, a paradigm was affirmed that had its references in the rational-
deductive approach of the economic-managerial disciplines. The most important exponents of this 
address were McCarthy (1960), Levitt (1960) and Kotler (1967). Kotler played a particularly 
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important role in the diffusion of a typically managerial approach resumed in a four step scheme: 
Analysis,  Planning,  Implementation  and  Control  (APIC).    In  the  1970s,  this  approach  was 
consolidated and became the hegemonic paradigm resulting also from an interesting classification 
of the epistemological and marketing thematic presented by Shelby D. Hunt
55. However, to be 
noted is that this approach had a substantially unbalanced structure arising from the fact that 
traditionally a normative approach results in the applicative form of a positive analysis of the 
reality investigated. The fact that a considerable part of positive marketing analyses, relating to 
consumer analyses, postulated scientific skills decidedly outside of managerial studies, impeded a 
direct  positive-normative  dialectic  also  reflected  in  normative  marketing  studies.  Classical 
marketing manuals presupposed the need for the subject agent of a marketing program to analyze 
the  behavior  of  the  consumer,  but  did  not  provide  the  methodological  instruments  to  do  so. 
Amongst others, the APIC paradigm recommended integration of market studies with competitive 
studies  and  consumer  studies,  representing  the  other  branch,  but  in  fact  dedicated  somewhat 
limited attention to it compared to its importance. 
The  effect  of  this  separation  and  the  secondary  role  of  consumer  behavior  was  also 
maintained when psychological and sociological studies oriented to a deductivist sense
56 were 
added alongside behavioral type studies, more analogous to the methodological statute of the 
managerial sciences, but far from the typical skills of the marketing scholar. 
 
 
4.3.  Micromarketing, macromarketing and exchange marketing 
A first internal contraposition in marketing studies concerns the dichotomy between micro 
and macro marketing. Micro or macro studies date back to the genesis of the discipline, but 
acquired conceptual valence only in the 1970s, due to the fact that in those years the debate took 
shape of whether marketing should only concern profit-oriented activities or if the discipline was 
also relevant for non-profit activities. This issue was inspired by a series of contributions by 
Kotler and Levy (1969), Ferber (1970), Zaltman (1971), Kotler (1972), and was to be resolved 
quite unanimously in favor of an enlargement of marketing studies to also include non-profit 
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activities
57. This comparison of ideas played an important role in that it began to prepare the 
ground for the subsequent comparison between micro and macro marketing and began to ask the 
question if behind the difference of problems analyzed (profit and nonprofit) there are (or should 
be) also different methodological options. This dilemma was not immediately forewarned of, in 
the sense that it seemed that the previous definition of marketing could also be extended to new 
issues without the need for a revision of the perspective. The fact that marketing had recently 
been  recognized  as  an  autonomous  science  which  for  reasons  of  convenience  here  we  call 
"marketing management", clearly plays in favor of a horizontal enlargement of the marketing 
competences
 58. However, the reproposition of a distinction such as that between micro and macro 
marketing  contributes  to  a  better  focus  on  the  issue  since  micromarketing  analyses  tend  to 
inevitable be made by assuming the viewpoint of a particular agent of the exchange relation 
typically  represented  by  the  firm  and  in  particular  by  its  function  of  marketing  and 
commercialization
59. This view, in terms of being directly aimed at the operational requirements 
of the large firm experienced a quantitative development not only in terms of studies, but also in 
qualitative terms through the development of a toolbox able to significantly help the marketing 
manager in his commercial policy and communication choices. For example: (a) the introduction 
of  the  concept  of  product  life  cycle  developed  for  the  first  time  by  Joel  Dean  (1950)  and 
successively  declined  in  a  variety  of  approaches,  some  of  which  however  were  very 
questionable
60; (b) the importance of market segmentation stressed by Wendell R. Smith in 1956; 
(c) the concept of the marketing mix initially proposed by Borden (1964). Despite the evident 
successes of the discipline, the accusation deriving from the criticisms of Vance Packard and 
others, who indicated marketing as an instrument for the exclusive service of firms and not the 
consumer and advertising as a tool of persuasion or even manipulation, must be counteracted with 
a thorough revision from the point of view of the analysis. The answer lies precisely in the 
methodological  proposal  of  macromarketing.  While  profit  issues  remain  a  central  pillar  of 
micromarketing  research  and  are  based  on a  n o r m a t i v e  a p p r o a c h ,  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  
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macromarketing necessarily entail the analysis of a multiplicity of points of view that consider 
not only actors who operate on the supply side of goods, traditionally having greater bargaining 
power than individual consumers, but also the institutional subjects. Macromarketing is supposed 
to  elaborate  proposals  of  markets’  regulations d i r e c t e d  a t  c o n c r e t i z ing  the  much-vaunted 
"sovereignty of the consumer"  operated by the liberal economic thought, but difficult to trace in 
the concrete functioning of the markets, especially after the emergence of  big business in the 
second half of the XIX century
61. It is clear that for this type of study an approach is needed that 
is more closely linked to Commons’ and Veblen’s institutionalist type of economic analysis. The 
inclusion of macromarketing alongside micromarketing therefore has an important role in that it 
places at the centre of the debate as much the cognitive objectives of at least part of marketing as 
well as a methodology that cannot be exclusively empiricist or rationalist. Among other things, 
this debate has also had the effect of driving outstanding scholars of marketing management to 
question their research objectives and give more room, in their analysis, to collective interests not 
based on those of the firm. A development of the debate in this sense seems to be the redefinition 
of marketing as a science of exchange (exchange marketing). By placing the exchange at the 
centre of the analysis
62, on the one hand trying to establish the discipline on a phenomenon of 
maximum universality, in order to derive nomothetic type generalizations, but on the other to 
postulate a study of distinct interests that are to be mediated in the exchange relation itself. With 
this  view,  positive  analysis  gains  weight  in  the  functionality  of  markets  and  the  search  for 
solutions with similar cognitive objectives to welfare economics. An echo of this new sensitivity 
can also be found, in our opinion, in the relationship marketing approach discussed later. 
 
4.4.  Strategic marketing vs. operative marketing  
The  distinction  between  “strategic”  and  “operative”  marketing  is c o m m o n l y  u s e d  t o  
distinguish two phases having different goals and based on different conceptual tools. Strategic 
marketing concerns the choice of policies aiming at improving the competitive position of the 
firm, taking account of challenges and opportunities proposed by the competitive environment 
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and the firm’s internal skills and available resources
63. Operative marketing is focused on the 
implementation of specific targets. If accepting this distinction, then the methodological problem 
of strategic marketing refers on the one hand to the knowledge of the states of reality (knowledge 
of the competitive environment), and on the other, to knowledge of the competitive models, i.e. 
the mechanisms governing the creation of durable competitive advantage. The methodological 
problem of operative marketing instead concerns the knowledge of links between the actions that 
the firm can put into effect and the changes in the competitive environment. The two issues seem 
significantly  separate  on  a  level  of  epistemological  implications;  more  precisely,  strategic 
marketing  requires  both  reading  and  interpreting  the  economic  evolution  of  a  complex 
environment directly related to a wide array of social, political, organizational phenomena. In the 
strategic analysis, it is possible to recognize many different schemes of analysis derived from 
alternative epistemological points of view. Studies based on the PIMS data base – Profit Impact 
of Marketing Strategy – amongst which that of Buzzel et al. (1975) is illustrative, are a typical  
expression of empiricism and generally indicated as the first of this strand that was characterized 
by a strongly empiricist and deterministic approach
64. There were also positions more oriented to 
adopting critical rationalism, prevalent in the formulation of competitive positioning models
65. 
This evolution of the marketing study orientation was probably due to the long phase of growth in 
the international economy that started in the ‘70s. The Ansoff (1965) studies on diversification 
can be ascribed to this particular situation. But more recently the changes and turmoil generated 
by globalization has favoured a different approach that is closer to an institutionalist point of view 
such as that recognizable in the resource-based orientation
66. 
Operative marketing, instead, that takes as a given the interpretation of the environment 
operated by the strategic phase and defined objectives, restricts the cognitive issue of validation 
of the hypotheses on the specific relations linking interventions on the environment, or parts of it, 
and their changes in the functional direction to business goals. The wide use of statistical models 
connotes operational marketing as a prevalently empiricist discipline, where strategic analysis 
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often deductively interprets reality, in the light of a series of principles that unite reason to the 
experience or to the historic reality. 
 
4.5.  Marketing management vs. relationship marketing  
The best known and most widespread expression of the marketing discipline, often also 
referred to as "marketing management", proposes to organize and coordinate the principles in two 
dimensions, strategic and operational, with an objective to business goals and with the basic 
assumption that the ability of a business to meet the needs of its target market is the engine of a 
virtuous circle, synthetically termed "market orientation" that generates new resources for the 
renewal of the offer
67. 
The foundations of this view were disputed towards the end of the 1980s by an approach 
that enhanced the importance of developing long-term relations among players interested in the 
exchange (Gummesson, 1987), from which the name relationship marketing
68 derives. While in 
marketing management the objective is to maximize the value of the individual exchange or a set 
of exchanges, considered in isolation through the action on the object of the exchange (product), 
and on the creation of conditions of exchange that exploit the characteristics of the segment of 
reference (distribution, price, communication). Relationship marketing instead aims to maximize 
on the one hand, the value of all potential exchanges that each relation could activate in the 
future, and on the other, the value of the exchange for both contractors, focusing basically on the 
loyalty of the customer and the creation of personalized exchange conditions
69. In the pursuit of 
this approach, the entire organization of an enterprise and the way in which it is coordinated with 
the  customer  interface  that  includes  the  involvement of the customer in the firm’s processes 
assumes  importance,  whereas  in  the  traditional  approach  the  customer  and  the  organization 
behind the distribution function were clearly separate (Gronroos, 1990).  
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which was then in a certain sense suffocated by the development of mass production. 
69 Gordon (1998) identifies six key points that differentiate relational marketing from traditional marketing, but on 
close examination these points are a more particular characterization of operative marketing than actual conceptual 
diversity. Gummesson (1997) speaks of relationship marketing as a "paradigm shift" deriving from focusing on 
aspects neglected by traditional marketing (mainly the relations, the network, the collaboration).    36
In  the  course  of  time,  the  contrast  between  these  two  types  of  marketing  gradually 
diminished, both due to the introduction in traditional marketing, of an ever-greater attention to 
the  customer,  and  for  the  effective  mutual  fertilization  of  the  two  approaches.  Today  the 
differences seem limited to that which just above has been defined as "operative marketing", 
because the two approaches do not seem to present methodological differences as far as the 
underlying  principles  and  the  analytical  part  of  support  are  concerned,  although  there  are 
differences  in  objectives  and  principles.  Marketing  management  assumes  detailed  consumer 
preferences as its analysis objective where these do not assume a more precise identity than 
belonging to a certain segment (target market); relationship marketing instead contends that these 
relations should be the analysis objectives and marketing levers
70 at the same time, with the 
purpose of achieving a total individualization of policies. The focalization on the "relation" does 
not suggest principles that are antithetical or incompatible with those that guide the relation with 
the customer in marketing management. The literature inherent in CRM seems to be an attempt to 
metabolize the relational principles of operative marketing. In a hypothetical situation in which it 
is economically possible and convenient to devise and serve segments formed by only one client 
the differences between the two views are few (and certainly not epistemological). 
 
4.6.  Fordism and post-Fordist marketing  
An important point in marketing studies is the distinction between Fordism and post-Fordist 
marketing. As known, Henry Ford’s strategy was based on a policy of strict standardization of 
product which, accompanied by a large scale offer, allowed minimizing production costs and thus 
aimed  for  strong  market  penetration  in  the  first  stages  of  motorization.  We  know  that  the 
automotive  market’s  passage  from  an  first  purchase  stage  to  the  replacement  purchase  stage 
considerably reduced the attractiveness of the Ford proposal in favor of producers who were more 
oriented to meeting the increasing degree of segmentation of demand. This occurred in the United 
States in the 1920s, thanks to Alfred P. Sloan’s (1993) strategy that was guided by the motto "a 
car for every purse and purpose" with which the General Motors Group managed to undermine 
Ford’s position as top producer in the world. In Europe, the Fordist phase occurred later than in 
the US and subsequently the transition to post-Fordism also occurred later. However, towards the 
end of the 1980s, the traditional Fordist model was superseded everywhere, also as a result of the 
                                                 
70 Gummesson (1994) proposes a “checklist” of 30 key points to analyze in this regard.   37
effect of Japanese competition
71. The development first defined as post-Fordism then became 
defined as post-industrialism. In the post-Fordist phase the emphasis in research and marketing of 
normative proposals focused on consumer preference for variety and innovation in the sense of 
exalting the differentiation of range and specificity of each producer’s brand. The replacement 
demand for cars in all major markets demonstrated that the competitive game rewarded producers 
who  were  in  a  position  to  expand  the  offer  with  niche  products  characterized  by  strong 
innovation. Marketing research therefore made reference to new concepts
72, amongst others, mass 
customization,  customer  satisfaction,  time-to-market  reduction,  etc.  One  aspect  of  this  new 
approach was also the accentuation of the role played by customer loyalty. 
It is noteworthy that in this case, the different accentuation of marketing studies did not 
imply any significant epistemological change of perspective. In general, these studies inscribe 
themselves in the normative rationality stream typical of marketing management without feeling 
the need to change their approach following the change of focus of their analyses. 
However, post-Fordism was rapidly followed by the transition to post-industrialism, that 
is to say, to a situation where the economic driving force assumed a new centre of gravity that no 
longer saw manufacturing as a strategic role of the modern economy. On the one hand, it became 
more and more convenient to relocate production activities to countries with low labour costs, on 
the other, a new industrial revolution powered by computer science and telematics was consoli-
dated. The highest added value activities were no longer in the hard component of products but in 
the soft component. Service activities with high added value emerged which became the new 
frontier of the economy. Here we face a more radical change from that described by the transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordism and signs of the utility of a broader methodological reflection 
became more visible. This exigency has been  thrust into the limelight by studies dedicated to 
postmodern marketing.  
 
4.7.  Postmodern marketing, School of Critical Theory, School of Hermeneutics. 
If, as we have seen, the emergence of a postindustrial phase began to emphasize the need 
for new changes also in the methodological approach of the discipline, then this trend became 
even  more  apparent  with  the  subsequent  passage  from  the  "modern"  to  the  "postmodern",  a 
                                                 
71 Freyssenet ey al. (1998). 
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change that some authors began to report from the 1930's, but which became a culturally relevant 
phenomenon in the 1990s. 
Trying to give precise content to the postmodern concept in the limited space of an article 
is virtually impossible, we must therefore refer to the contributions specifically dedicated to this 
issue
73 also because we face a multifaceted cultural phenomenon concerning a multiplicity  of 
areas: some of a scientific-philosophical nature, amongst which economics and marketing, in 
addition to philosophy, and others more closely linked to art, literature, architecture, linguistic 
and visual communications. Here we can only recall that postmodernism is characterized in a 
cultural sense by the recognition that the myths of progress
74 and humanity’s walk towards a 
more just and balanced future is not only not foregone, as the thought matured in siècle des 
lumières had postulated, but neither is it realistic. Society loses its principal teleological reference 
and individuals were overrun by a feeling we could call "anomy", even if this term was born with 
Durkeim long before the concept of postmodernism was coined. This implied, especially on an 
individual  level,  a  search  of  the  definition  of  own  identity.  Consequently,  this  new  mood 
presumed a different function of the theory. 
The  responses  elaborated  by  marketing  scholars  move  in  three  directions:  (a)  that 
represented by exchange marketing which in a certain sense is further strengthened by those who 
tend to be anchored to the classic empiricist vision of the previously mentioned separation of 
investigating subject and object investigated (b) the critical theory; the detailed and complex 
theory of postmodern marketing in the proper sense that later on we characterize above all in a 
hermeneutic sense.  
From the critical theory perspective it is assumed that theory cannot only describe that 
which is existing, but must be used to change the world, i.e. theory that drives a practice of 
change. A change stimulated also in the methodological bases of analysis of firms and consumers. 
In  the  orientation  that  is  acknowledged  in  critical t h e o r y ,  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  r e f e r e n c e  i s  t o  t h e  
Frankfurt School whose scientific advances wind through a multiplicity of elaborations that in a 
more recent version are summed up in Jürgen Habermas’ contributions. The characteristic of this 
approach  is  based  on  the  view  that  a  scientific  attitude c a n  o n l y  b e  a t tained  through  the 
development  of  thought  that  not  only  describes  the  reality  investigated,  but  also  indicates  a 
                                                 
73 See  Firat and Venkatesh (1993), Firat et al. (1994), Brown (1995), Cova (1996),  
74 Myths that started to shape the Enlightenment   39
concrete praxis to change the negative aspects of this reality
75. The point of departure is therefore 
similar to that of Marxist critique of capitalist society. A society characterized by conflicts of 
opposing  interests,  but  whose  nature  today  is  very  different  from  that  of  capitalists  and  the 
proletariat of XIX century. The much wider conflict that exponents of this position applied to 
marketing  is  presented  especially  in  the  contrast  between  consumers  on  one  side  and  large 
industrial enterprises on the other. Large enterprises that cannot but apply a logic of profit in the 
short  term  apparently  aimed  at  meeting  consumer  needs,  but  in  fact  aggravating  the  social 
contradictions of the world: exploitation of strong economies to the detriment of weak economies, 
foolish use of natural resources, worsening ecological problems, etc. Marketing inspired by the 
"critical theory" therefore has the onus of analyzing the contradictions in the social organization 
and developing indications that demonstrate to consumers the ways they can exercise their buying 
power  to  promote  change,  for  example  in  favor  of  ecologically  correct  consumption  that  is 
equitable  and  fair.  This  critical  marketing  can  and  must  drive  a  policy  of  consumer 
"emancipation"
76. From a methodological point of view, the rupture between this orientation and 
classic marketing management could not be more radical. Here the epistemological references are 
those of the historical totality that must be analyzed with the analyst’s assumption of the interests 
of society as a whole in order to highlight the contradictions between the operation of the system 
and the emancipation of the individual. The focus of the analysis is aimed at the identification of 
emerging contradictions between the effective functioning of the social structure (the product of 
prior  choices  and  interests)  and  the  new  needs  of  emancipation  of  the  various  categories  of 
persons and of the weakest in particular (minorities, children, women, etc.). The cultural matrix is 
Hegelian and Marxian, even if overcoming the contradictions that did not come about through 
dialectic but by means of initiatives of this researcher who became an active actor of change and 
of legitimate, but unprotected, interests. 
From the hermeneutic
77 perspective, the recall to postmodernism is much more limited, 
even  if  this  approach  does  not  exhaust  the  possible  valance  of  postmodernism  that  may  be 
declinated in a plurality of specific orientations. The hermeneutic perspective seems the most 
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presentation of its methodological cornerstone, see Connerton’s (1976) summary.
 
76 This type of position is expressed in a particularly apparent way in Murray and Ozanne (1991).  
77 Some exponents of critical theory indicate the approach we call hermeneutic as interpretationist. See Murray and 
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epistemological and therefore the most relevant.  In its more radical conception, social reality 
is seen as a result constructed on the perception of subjects and on the linguistic intermediation of 
actors. The cultural and methodological references were those of more recent French philosophy 
developed on the bases of existentialism and which took a mature conceptual form through the 
subsequent  elaborations  of  many  scholars  including  Jean-François  Lyotard  (1926-1998)
78, 
Jacques  Santer,  Jean  Baudrillard  and  Edgar  Morin,  characterizing  the  current  era  termed 
postmodern, for the loss of sense that stemmed from the ideological premise that society and 
history were oriented to (and could be interpreted by) a single meaning such as, for example: a) 
the affirmation of the reason of the Enlightenment, b) the movement summing up the spirit of 
idealism, c) the technological and scientific progress in terms of efficiency of capitalism, d) the 
laws of historical materialism of Marxism, etc. Post-modernity is characterized by the fall of 
these  ideologies  and  consequently  the  dissolution  of  stable  certainties  that  provide  a  precise 
meaning to life and identity to subjects according to the ideology they recognize themselves in. In 
this new era, reality is the result of irreducible differences, of a variety of purposes and points of 
view. This also represented several positive aspects that freed new energies and greater creative 
potential, but for many actors was a rather stressful reality. Man is disarmed in front of world 
events that globalization metaphorically brings to the threshold. He no longer has the certainty of 
being able to give a stable meaning to things, nor knows how to interpret, and therefore in some 
way master, all the changes to which he is exposed. 
Moving directly onto the impact of this vision on a marketing level, it follows that the 
postmodern era was also a time of image (accentuated by the identifying role of the product with 
respect to the consumer, the symbolic expression of the status and personality in its many facets), 
of subjective experience that seeks to recognize and identify itself in group life (tribal marketing, 
viral marketing, buzz marketing, etc.), of the prominent role played by the product sharing in the 
formation of affinity consumer circles (various methods of using e-marketing in the creation of 
blogs  and  second-life  type  experiences),  of  the  recognition  of  the  importance  of  making  the 
consumer  the  protagonist  in  the  marketing  relation  with  the  company  that  offers  products 
(product  launches  as  events  associated  with  shows,  consumer  forums  in  new  product 
presentations, etc.), the utility of transforming the point of sale from a supply centre of goods and 
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services  as  a  time  of  experiential  social  community  relations,  of  media  events,  of  elective 
affinities between consumers. Further examples could be given but we think the results of the 
diffusion of postmodern cultural models are by now quite clear. All that remains necessary are 
two  further  sentences  to  emphasize  that  the  hermeneutic  outlook  institutionalizes  relativism. 
There is not one reality, but many different realities. Above all, an ad hoc reality for a certain 
category of consumer can be created through initiatives of aggregation, exploiting for example 
the new opportunities offered by new multimedia tools in terms of: one-to-many relationship, 
speed  of  contacts  and  richness  of  the  content  of  contact.  The  hermeneutic  approach  is 
distinguished not only by the fact that it manifests itself in a highly subjective dialectic, but also 
by placing focus on the subjectivity of persons participating in the exchange, and even more on 
the subjectivity of consumers themselves. It wouldn’t be useless to underline that this perspective 
is on one side fascinating and goes towards consumer emancipation, but on the other side offers 
the possibility of developing into the triumph of Vance Packard’s  Hidden Persuaders. 
 
4.8.  Experiential marketing 
The concept of experiential marketing was originally introduced by Schmitt (1999), who, 
drawing on the well-known contribution of Pine and Gilmore (1998), stressed the importance of 
the  "experience"  in  creating  a  perception  of  value  in  the  customer.  Basically,  for  Pine  and 
Gilmore it was about enhancing the offer and image of the enterprise through the creation and 
sale of experience based on consumer participation and the aggregation of consumers who take 
part. Pine and Gilmore did not speak of experiential marketing, but of a generic "experience 
economy",  whilst  Schmitt’s  contribution  is  much  more  detailed  and  opposes  the  experiential 
approach to four limits that he identified in the traditional marketing approach: a) attention to the 
experience of the consumer vs. the prevailing attention to the functional features and benefits
79; 
(b) attention to the consumption experience in its entirety vs. the definition of the borders of 
restricted  competition  to  the  product  categories; ( c )  t h e  c o n s u m e r  s e e n  a s  a n  e m o t i o n a l  a n d  
rational decision maker rather than purely rational; (d) the use of eclectic methods and tools 
instead of exclusively analytical, quantitative and verbal methods and instruments. Subsequently, 
Schmitt  detailed  an  "operational"  proposal,  but  which  in  fact  was  entirely  free  of  empirical 
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analyses, that identified and classified the types of experience and their sources, with normative 
indications  on  the  possible  ways  of  relating  with  customers,  which  in  fact  constituted  the 
operational part of experiential marketing. 
It  seems  to  us  that  this  author’s  approach  can  be  considered  as  closely  matching  a 
postmodern interpretation of the needs of the consumer to an operational program of critical 
rationalism. A contamination that has become more frequent in this new century where a large 
number  of  marketing  management  authors  feel  the  need  to  take  control  of  new  labels  of  an 
innovative flavor and stimulating perspectives (the marketing of marketing theories also exists!). 
 
4.9.  Service-Dominant Marketing 
We  conclude  our  review  of  marketing  approaches
80 b y  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  a n  
approach denoted as a service-dominant logic and proposed by Vargo and Lusch (2004). As 
indicated, this approach could be read as a restatement of a new label for known content
81 and 
there  are  also  those  who  recently  complained  about  the  need  of  marketing  to  take  on  new 
approaches and new content
82. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this approach has received 
considerable attention and significant conferences have been dedicated to it, organized amongst 
others, by the Marketing Association in 2004 and the European Academy of Marketing in 2005. 
This approach postulates that the service perspective is the core-concept of marketing and that 
products must be regarded as mere instruments aimed at producing services for the buyer. The 
creation of value is apparently not so much in the exchange of goods (value in exchange) as 
assumed by exchange marketing, but rather in the value of the use of goods (value-in-use). This 
approach naturally exalts to the maximum the dialogue and co-creation of value of the interaction 
between the supplier of goods and services and purchasing company
83 (Payne et al. 2008) and 
between the company selling and the consumer, with an exaltation of the peer-to-peer relationship 
between supplier and the service recipient, which is inscribed in a now consolidated tendency 
when looking at B2B relations along the supply-chain, but which still seems very problematic 
between supplier and consumer. In epistemological terms, this approach seems to represent a 
                                                 
80 For lack of space, we leave out the analysis of "ethical marketing" and "fair trade marketing" which are typical of 
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81 Ballantyne & Varey (2008). 
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83 Payne et al. (2008).   43
generalization  of  relational  marketing  but  with  more  robust  connections  to  the  demands  of 
institutional  marketing  sensitive  to  a  balanced  examination  of  the  interests  of  the  various 
categories of actors and characterized by the role of third parties (institutions) with respect to 
those typical of exchange. The novelty compared to relational marketing is that it is seen as 
specialist marketing dedicated precisely to the relations in the supply-chain and collateral with 
respect to exchange marketing, while service-dominant marketing was born as an extension of 
totalitarian relational marketing and aims to enhance the values and activities able to centre on the 
long-lasting relationship between producer and service user. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Our  analysis  shows  the  existence  of  a  wide d i v e r s i t y  o f  m e t h o d o l ogical  perspectives, 
especially  within  the  first  two  level  of  the  taxonomy  (epistemological  roots  and  economic 
approaches). Through an assortment of heterogeneous viewpoints, the range of positions varies 
from empiricist ones, aiming at constituting a nomothetic science (modernist vision) based on 
general  and  universal  laws,  up  to  hermeneutic  positions  that  deny  both  the  possibility  to 
determine universal laws, and the significance (objectivity) of data and fact derived from the 
direct experience. Generally speaking, there is no doubt that empiricism suffer from growing 
number of critiques and it is increasing the influence of those who claim for economics a status of 
typical  social  science,  whose  rules  of  interpretation  have  to  be  defined  within  a  historically-
featured framework.  
As  for  marketing  scholars  positions,  an  evolving process analogue to  that  of  economic 
science is confirmed; though, we feel to remark that this partial re-positioning of a part of authors 
does not go together with a thoughtful consideration on the significance and the methodological 
meaning and/or implications of this change in perspective. 
Basically,  the  attitude  of  those  who  think  in  terms  of    “weakening”  the  nomothetic 
approach, rather than trying to define properly an historical approach, is prevailing; this happen 
even between those researchers who seem most responsive towards a re-examination of their own 
analysis in an anti-nomthetic direction. In effect, in several cases a hybrid position emerges where 
the analysis try to consider the historical characterization, but without implying also a reflection 
about the consequences that this change should have on the epistemological ground, that very 
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